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A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO RISKS 
AND UNCERTAINTIES UNDER NEPA 
Todd S. Aagaard* 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates that federal 
agencies evaluate the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. This re-
quires agencies to make ex ante predictions about environmental consequences 
that often involve a significant degree of factual risk or uncertainty. Considerable 
controversy exists regarding how agencies should address such risks and uncer-
tainties. Current NEPA law adopts a largely ad hoc approach that lacks 
coherence and analytical rigor. Some environmentalists and legal scholars have 
called for a greater emphasis on worst-case analysis in environmental planning, 
especially after the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and 
the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors in Japan, both of which 
involved the eventuation of risks dismissed ex ante as improbable. This Article 
proposes a functional approach to environmental risks and uncertainties under 
NEPA as a preferable alternative to both a worst-case analysis requirement and 
the morass of existing approaches. A functional approach that is sensitive to con-
text and analytically focused is better suited to the complexities of environmental 
planning. It is consonant with current NEPA law, but also can refine existing 
law to develop requirements that focus on effectuating NEPA’s purposes by pro-
ducing useful environmental information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal 
agencies to prepare and to release to the public an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) before taking any major action “significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.”1 This information-forcing requirement 
serves two objectives: (1) to induce agencies to consider environmental 
impacts in their decision making, and (2) to inform the public about the 
agencies’ decision-making processes.2 Because NEPA mandates that agen-
cies evaluate the environmental impacts of a proposed action before the 
action occurs, NEPA requires agencies to make ex ante predictions about 
the consequences of actions they are considering. With some proposed 
actions, the consequences are relatively clear and certain. In many, if not 
most, cases, however, predicting environmental consequences involves a 
significant degree of factual risk or uncertainty.3 
This factual risk and uncertainty, in turn, has generated legal contro-
versy about what consequences NEPA requires an agency to evaluate. If it 
is possible but highly unlikely that a nuclear reactor will have an accident 
that results in a meltdown of its reactor core, is a nuclear meltdown an 
“environmental impact” of the construction and operation of a nuclear 
reactor?4 If it is unclear whether or not an herbicide causes cancer, is an 
increased risk of cancer an “environmental impact” of a program to spray 
the herbicide on forests?5 
Especially where potential consequences of an agency action include 
unlikely but catastrophic outcomes such as a nuclear meltdown, it is intui-
tively appealing to resort to a worst-case analysis to address risks and  
uncertainties. If something terrible could happen, even if it probably will 
                                                                                                                      
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).See also infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 
(1983); cf. Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical 
Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 768 (2002) (describing NEPA as an “information-forcing” 
statute). 
 3. Although risk and uncertainty are synonyms to the extent both can mean the 
possibility that something may or may not occur, see WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1018, 1283 (1986), risk focuses more on the likelihood of occurrence while 
uncertainty emphasizes the lack of knowledge about what will occur. Economist Frank 
Knight distinguished between risk, which he regarded as measurable, and uncertainty, which 
is unmeasurable. FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-21 (1921). Legal 
scholars often employ Knight’s distinction. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 901, 903 (2011); Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 428–29 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 
91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 876 (2006); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contrac-
tual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 759 (2009). 
 4. See Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 5. See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984); S. Or. Citizens 
Against Toxic Sprays (SOCATS) v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983). 
  
Spring 2012] A Functional Approach to Risks & Uncertainties Under NEPA 89 
not, then it seems obvious that agencies should consider that possibility 
before embarking on the action. Considering the possibility of a severe 
outcome could allow the agency to take action to reduce the risk, to plan for 
responses if the risk were to eventuate, or to reconsider taking the action in 
the first place. 
A 1978 NEPA regulation required agencies to address uncertainties 
with worst-case analyses.6 After it generated significant controversy,7 that 
regulation was amended in 1986 to rescind the worst-case requirement,  
and replaced with a more flexible mandate that agencies must discuss the 
uncertainties in their analyses.8 In the twenty-five years since, no clear 
understanding has arisen as to how agencies should address uncertainties in 
predicting environmental consequences in their NEPA documents. Agencies 
have addressed the issue on an ad hoc rather than systematic basis, and 
courts reviewing challenges to agency NEPA analyses have treated uncer-
tainties erratically as well. 
In the face of this mess, environmentalists and legal scholars periodically 
call for reinstating the worst-case requirement from the 1978 regulation. 
Most recently, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010 and the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors in Japan 
in 2011 renewed calls for revitalizing worst-case analysis in NEPA as a 
means of better addressing catastrophic environmental risks.9 
                                                                                                                      
 6. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1979). 
 7. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 8. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1986). 
 9. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, NEPA and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, LAW, ECON. 
& CYCLING (May 2, 2010, 8:13 AM), http://cyclingprof.blogspot.com/2010/05/nepa-and-
deepwater-horizon-oil-spill.html (“[A]n EIS that includes a worst-case analysis is more 
likely to result in additional safety measures being imposed than an EIS that does not 
include one. For that reason, I support [Holly Doremus’] call for CEQ to reintroduce a 
worst-case analysis requirement into its NEPA regulations.”); Holly Doremus, A Great Case 
for Worst Case Analysis, LEGAL PLANET (May 1, 2010), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/ 
2010/05/01/a-great-case-for-worst-case-analysis/ (“The recent Gulf oil disaster offers a 
powerful argument for going back to the original requirement for worst-case analysis, which 
the current regulation allows agencies to avoid.”); Lesley McAllister, Learning from Another 
Worst-Case Scenario, ENVTL. LAW PROF BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011), http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/environmental_law/2011/03/learning-from-another-worst-case-scenario.html 
(“[A]s we make energy policies, our decision-making processes must identify and analyze 
worst case scenarios. As we learned with the BP oil spew (I can’t call it a spill when it wasn’t) 
and now this, worst case scenarios really can happen.”); Dennis Takahashi Kelso, Exec. Vice 
President, Ocean Conservancy, Written Testimony to the Nat’l Comm’n on the BP  
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 8 (Sept. 22, 2010), http://act. 
oceanconservancy.org/site/DocServer/Delete.100927_Dennis_Kelso_Nat_l_Oil_Spill_Comm_ 
Written_Testimo.pdf%20?docID=6421 (arguing that the failures leading to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill “point to the need for more rigorous requirements for worst-case scenario 
analyses” and noting that “[d]espite their importance, now underscored by the BP spill, 
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This Article argues against proposals to require agencies to analyze 
worst-case scenarios in their NEPA analyses, identifying three obstacles to 
using worst-case analyses for NEPA planning. First, it is often unclear what 
scenario constitutes the worst case. Some scenarios, for example, must be 
too unlikely to warrant examination. Any serious proposal for worst-case 
analysis therefore would have to limit itself to significant risks and uncer-
tainties, a complex concept that necessitates a context-sensitive standard. 
Second, risks and uncertainties are so pervasive in environmental  
planning that it would be impossible to implement an across-the-board rule 
that requires agencies to discuss all significant risks and uncertainties  
in terms of a worst case. Risks and uncertainties play varying roles in  
environmental planning, and NEPA law should reflect that variation with a 
flexible standard. 
Third, worst-case analysis, by singling out one low-probability adverse 
outcome for focused analysis, conflicts with the political and institutional 
realities of agency decision making. Agencies will tend to downplay the 
possibility of low-probability risks, and project opponents will tend to 
concentrate on them. As a result of this dynamic, a rule requiring worst-
case analysis would tend to create conflict over what scenario represents the 
appropriate “worst case” instead of focusing on how to plan in the face of 
risks and uncertainties that create a range of possible outcomes. 
Thus, the apparently simple and clear mandate of worst-case analysis 
falls apart in the complicated realities of environmental planning. Despite 
the intuitive appeal of worst-case analysis, a worst-case requirement would 
not produce the benefits that its proponents envision. NEPA is widely 
recognized as an imperfect statute that generates too much rote discussion 
and not enough penetrating analysis. Proponents of worst-case analysis see 
a worst-case requirement as an opportunity to reverse this imbalance, to 
increase clarity and critical thinking in agencies’ NEPA analyses. In fact, 
however, a worst-case requirement would exacerbate rather than redress 
NEPA’s existing flaws. 
As a preferable alternative to both a worst-case analysis requirement 
and the morass of the existing ad hoc approach, this Article proposes a 
functional approach to environmental risks and uncertainties. A functional 
approach is sensitive to context, focusing on those characteristics of risks—
including probability, severity, and uncertainty—that determine which 
risks are significant and deserve consideration. A functional approach also 
requires agencies to focus on how risks and uncertainties affect their 
decisions instead of simply requiring disclosure of relevant risks and uncer-
tainties. This will increase the clarity and utility of agencies’ discussions of 
                                                                                                                      
worst-case scenarios have not been part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process”). 
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risks and uncertainties without overwhelming agencies or the public with 
excessive information. Finally, vigorous enforcement of procedural stand-
ards that govern administrative processes will counteract biases in both 
agencies and the interested public that can undermine the NEPA process 
generally, and discussions of risks and uncertainties in particular. A  
functional approach is well suited to the complexities of environmental 
planning. It is consonant with current NEPA law, but also can refine exist-
ing law to develop requirements that focus on effectuating NEPA’s 
purposes by producing useful environmental information. 
I. NEPA GENERALLY 
NEPA10 is often called the “Magna Carta” of environmental law.11 
NEPA’s objectives are ambitious: “to use all practicable means and 
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and  
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and 
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”12 Its 
scope is sweeping: it applies to all “major Federal actions significantly  
affecting the quality of the human environment”13 and to “all agencies of 
the Federal Government.”14 
                                                                                                                      
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006). 
 11. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 
209 (2004); Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its 
Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010); Arthur W. Murphy, The 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or 
Agency Coup De Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 963 (1972); Kenneth S. Weiner, NEPA and 
State NEPAs: Learning from the Past, Foresight for the Future, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,675, 10,675 (2009); cf. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 1 (1997), 
available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf (“The National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) is the foundation of modern American environmental protection.”).  
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(A) (2006). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). Regulations issued by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality define major federal actions as “actions with effects that may be major and 
which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility,” noting that federal 
actions tend to fall within one of four categories: “[a]doption of official policy,” “[a]doption 
of formal plans,” “[a]doption of programs,” or “[a]pproval of specific projects.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.18 (2011). An action by a state or private entity may constitute a major federal action 
for NEPA purposes if the state or private action cannot go forward without federal approv-
al. See Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d 297, 302 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2). “[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government” does not include 
the Congress, the Judiciary, or the Executive Office of the President. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 
(2011). Many states have enacted “so-called mini-NEPAs” that operate similarly to NEPA 
but apply to state, and sometimes private, actions. Michael B. Gerrard & Michael Herz, 
Harnessing Information Technology to Improve the Environmental Impact Review Process, 12 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 18, 21 (2003); see, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. 
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NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental conse-
quences of proposed major federal actions.15 In particular, NEPA requires  
a federal agency to prepare an EIS before taking any major action  
“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”16 The EIS 
must describe, among other things, the proposed action’s “environmental 
impact” and “adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided,” as 
well as “alternatives to the proposed action.”17 In short, NEPA “require[s] 
that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.”18 But 
NEPA’s requirements are procedural, not substantive.19 So long as “the 
adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately  
identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from  
deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.”20  
To coordinate implementation of NEPA across the federal govern-
ment, NEPA established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
within the Executive Office of the President.21 CEQ issues regulations 
interpreting NEPA.22 Because NEPA’s key provision requiring an EIS 
                                                                                                                      
RES. CODE §§ 21000–21178.1 (West 2011); Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61–62H (2011); New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 2011); State Environmental 
Policy Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010–.914 (2011). 
 15. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 553 (1978). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Not every federal action necessitates a full EIS. To 
determine whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action will be significant 
enough to warrant a full EIS, the agency may prepare an Environmental Assessment. See 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b)-(c), 1508.9 (2011). If, based on the Environmental Assessment, the 
agency concludes that the proposed action will not significantly impact the environment, it 
will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact in lieu of an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 
(2011). See generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–58 (2004) (providing 
an overview of EISs, Environmental Assessments, and Findings of No Significant Impact). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)–(iii). 
 18. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (quoting 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).  
 19. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980). 
 20. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344 (2006). 
 22. CEQ has no statutory rulemaking authority that would obligate federal agencies 
to comply with its regulations. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Rise and Fall of Worst Case 
Analysis, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 8 (1992). In 1970, three months after Congress enacted 
NEPA, President Nixon issued an executive order instructing CEQ to issue guidelines to 
assist federal agencies in implementing NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 104, 106 
(1971). Pursuant to this executive order, in the early 1970s CEQ issued and periodically 
amended nonbinding NEPA guidance. See Fitzgerald, supra, at 8. In 1977, President Carter 
issued an executive order authorizing CEQ to issue regulations and directing federal agen-
cies to follow CEQ’s regulations. See Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123, 124 (1978); see 
also Churchill Cnty. v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1072 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although initially 
advisory in nature, the [CEQ’s] regulations were made binding on the administrative agen-
cies by Executive Order No. 11991, 3 C.F.R. § 124. ‘CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is 
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provides only a “cryptic mandate,” CEQ’s more detailed regulations are 
considered “the key to compliance with NEPA.”23 
By all accounts, NEPA has enjoyed mixed success over its forty-year 
history in accomplishing its ambitious goals. On the upside, NEPA’s  
requirement that agencies consider the environmental consequences of their 
decisions before taking action has put the environment on the agenda of 
agencies throughout the federal government, many of which have not tradi-
tionally viewed environmental protection as one of their considerations.24 
Most studies have found that NEPA “has had a moderately positive effect” 
in inducing agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision 
making.25 By requiring the public disclosure of EISs and Environmental 
Assessments, NEPA has increased public access to information about the 
environmental consequences of government action and has increased the 
transparency of agency decision-making processes more generally.26 
On the downside, NEPA has been criticized both by those who think 
its effects on environmental protection are weak and by those who view its 
requirements as overly burdensome. Despite the differences in perspective 
between these two groups of critics, one of which thinks NEPA should do 
more and one of which thinks NEPA should do less, their complaints share 
a common theme asserting that NEPA tends to result in “burdensome 
procedural formalities while accomplishing little or nothing of substance.”27 
Environmentalists complain that NEPA lacks efficacy without substantive 
commands28 and that agencies approach their NEPA analyses with an  
                                                                                                                      
entitled to substantial deference.’ ” (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 
(1979))). 
 23. Mandelker, supra note 11, at 297. 
 24. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Gov-
ernment’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904 (2002) (“[NEPA] forces 
agency managers to identify and confront the environmental consequences of their actions, 
about which they otherwise would remain ignorant.”); The National Environmental Policy Act 
40th Anniversary Symposium, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,183, 11,187 (2010) (tran-
scribing Nicholas Yost’s comment that “NEPA has achieved success, not only in its stated 
goal of building the environment into governmental decisionmaking, forcing agencies, if you 
will, to look before they leap environmentally, but it’s changed the way we think”). 
 25. Mandelker, supra note 11, at 294; see also GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., 
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 270 (6th ed. 2007) (“[T]here are numerous 
examples where NEPA prompted the government to think more broadly and deeply about 
environmental consequences and values.”); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal 
with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 39 (2009) 
(“[S]ome observers of the agency decision-making process have argued that NEPA has 
fundamentally changed how agencies operate.”). 
 26. Karkkainen, supra note 24, at 904–05. 
 27. Id. at 905. 
 28. Alyson C. Flournoy et al., Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect Our Public 
Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2008) (identifying NEPA’s “lack of 
substantive force” as the statute’s “most frequently identified shortcoming”); Joseph L. Sax, 
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overabundance of boilerplate language and a lack of critical and imaginative 
thinking.29 Critics troubled by the burdens NEPA imposes note that its 
requirements can slow down, increase the costs of, and even sink worth-
while and beneficial agency projects.30 
In addition to these criticisms, NEPA also has suffered from the  
realities of implementation in a more complex and less predictable world 
than its enactors contemplated: 
NEPA was born in an era that had faith in bureaucratic compre-
hensive rationality, the idea that predictive analysis of a broad class 
of administrative decisions would produce rational decision making 
that would consider environmental impacts. This hope disappeared 
with the understanding that environmental systems are complex, 
dynamic, nonlinear, and mutually independent, making environ-
mental prediction a much more difficult task. These complexities 
make the application of NEPA to actions and programs a much 
more difficult problem than initially expected.31 
These realities mean that agencies are virtually always working in circum-
stances of incomplete information and uncertainty; the ever-present 
questions facing agencies and courts are, under such circumstances, how 
much information and analysis is enough, and how should risks and  
uncertainties be reflected in agencies’ NEPA documents so as best to  
effectuate NEPA’s objectives? 
                                                                                                                      
The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239 (1973) (“I know of no solid 
evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, detailed findings or reasoned 
opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative decisions. I think the 
emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine parts myth and one 
part coconut oil.”). 
 29. See Karkkainen, supra note 24, at 906 (“Agencies have . . . routiniz[ed] and com-
partmentaliz[ed] their response, effectively marginalizing [NEPA’s] operative effect and 
thereby circumventing NEPA’s core purpose.”); id. at 923 (“EISs . . . tend to consist of 
exhaustive compilations of recycled information, sometimes of dubious quality.”). 
 30. Flournoy et al., supra note 28, at 1583 (citing the criticism that NEPA generates 
“overly lengthy documents that are less valuable than more concise, focused documents 
would be”); Karkkainen, supra note 24, at 905 (noting that criticisms “bemoan the length 
and cost of the NEPA process”); Mandelker, supra note 11, at 296 (“Another criticism of 
NEPA is that the statute has been used to obstruct decisions by federal agencies by slowing 
down agency decision-making, with negative effects on the ability of agencies to carry out 
their statutory duties.”). 
 31. Mandelker, supra note 11, at 294 (footnote omitted); see also Karkkainen, supra 
note 24, at 906 (“NEPA ambitiously, and naively, demands the impossible: comprehensive, 
synoptic rationality, in the form of an exhaustive, one-shot set of ex ante predictions of ex-
pected environmental impacts.” (emphasis added)). 
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II. NEPA’S TROUBLED HISTORY WITH RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES 
With most proposed federal actions, there is some degree of risk or  
uncertainty about the environmental consequences.32 Questions about how 
federal agencies are to comply with NEPA in the face of uncertainty or risk 
about the consequences of a project accordingly plagued NEPA from the 
outset.33 Given the pervasiveness of risk and uncertainty in environmental 
planning, NEPA must require an agency to discuss in some form the uncer-
tainty associated with possible environmental consequences of its proposed 
action for the agency’s analysis to be realistic and useful. Exactly what is 
required in such a discussion, however, has never been clear. 
In one early NEPA case from 1970, Carolina Environmental Study Group 
v. United States,34 for example, the D.C. Circuit rejected a claim that the 
Atomic Energy Commission violated NEPA by granting a construction 
license for two nuclear reactors without fully considering the consequences 
of a nuclear meltdown at the facilities. The Commission’s analysis had 
acknowledged that “the consequences [of meltdowns] could be severe,” but 
concluded that “the probability of their occurrence is so small that their 
environmental risk is extremely low.”35 The court held that the Commission 
had met its obligations under NEPA, noting that “[t]here is a point at 
which the probability of an occurrence may be so low as to render it almost 
totally unworthy of consideration.”36 
More generally, courts in early NEPA cases adopted a “rule of reason” 
by which to review the adequacy of EISs.37 As a subsidiary to the rule of 
reason, courts held that agencies need not address “remote and speculative 
possibilities” in their NEPA analyses.38 Courts sometimes invoked this 
subsidiary principle to limit the range of possible consequences that NEPA 
required agencies to consider in their analyses of environmental impacts. 
For example, in a 1977 case, National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. 
FCC,39 the D.C. Circuit held that the possibility that changes to the FCC’s 
fairness doctrine would “result in more ads for environmentally dangerous 
products, more use of such products, and therefore more harm to the  
                                                                                                                      
 32. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 33. Cf. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 970 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Because NEPA is 
silent on the problem of uncertainty . . . the courts have been forced to grapple with this 
issue . . . .”). 
 34. 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 35. Id. at 799. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 38. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d at 838. 
 39. 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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environment” was too “remote and speculative” to warrant consideration in  
an EIS.40 
When CEQ first issued NEPA interpretive regulations in 1978,41 it ad-
dressed the problem of risks and uncertainties with a provision requiring 
federal agencies to include a “worst-case analysis” when proceeding with  
a proposal in the face of uncertainty about its environmental impacts.42  
Although some commenters on the regulation “expressed concern that  
this requirement would place undue emphasis on the possible occurrence  
of adverse environmental consequences regardless of how remote the  
possibility might be,” CEQ believed that it addressed this concern by  
directing agencies to indicate in their analyses the likelihood of the worst-
case scenario’s occurrence.43 Subsequent guidance from CEQ advised that 
agencies faced with uncertainty were to consider the full spectrum of “all 
known possible” outcomes, from those with low probability and great  
impact to those with higher probability and less impact.44 
A series of cases in the early 1980s applied CEQ’s worst-case require-
ment. In the most widely known case, Sierra Club v. Sigler,45 the Fifth 
Circuit held that the worst-case regulation required the Army Corps of 
Engineers, before issuing permits for construction of a deepwater port and 
crude oil distribution system at Galveston, Texas, to analyze the conse-
quences of a worst-case accident scenario in which a supertanker would spill 
its entire load of oil into Galveston Bay.46 The Corps of Engineers had 
dismissed the likelihood of such an accident as “remote.”47 The Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed—or at least accepted for the purposes of argument—that “the 
possibility of a total cargo loss by a supertanker is remote,” but held that 
CEQ’s worst-case regulation required analysis of the scenario because “a 
total cargo loss could occur and could wreak catastrophic environmental 
damage in the Bay.”48 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that CEQ’s 
                                                                                                                      
 40. Id. at 1098 n.3; see, e.g., Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 828 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that an EIS is “not required to discuss remote and highly specula-
tive consequences” of a project). 
 41. National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (Nov. 29, 
1978).  
 42. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1979); see also National Environmental Policy Act—
Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. at 55,984 (describing section 1502.22 as requiring each agency to 
“prepare a worst case analysis of the risk and severity of possible adverse environmental 
impacts when it proceeds with a proposal in the face of uncertainty”). 
 43. National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. at 55,984. 
 44. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy 
Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (Mar. 23, 1981) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 
1500-1508) (emphasis omitted).  
 45. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 46. Id. at 972. 
 47. See id. at 973. 
 48. Id. at 974. 
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worst-case regulation had superseded prior NEPA precedent holding that 
agencies need not consider remote consequences of proposed actions.49 The 
Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that not every hypothetical scenario 
required evaluation; the court contrasted “phantasmagoria hypothesized 
without a firm basis in evidence and the actual circumstances of the con-
templated project,” which would not require discussion, with scenarios 
“where a real possibility of the occurrence has been proved,” which would 
require discussion.50 
Subsequent cases read the worst-case requirement perhaps even more 
broadly. In two cases addressing proposals by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment (BLM) to spray herbicides in Oregon forests, the Ninth Circuit held 
that CEQ’s worst-case regulation required agencies to examine worst-case 
scenarios even if they were extremely unlikely. In Southern Oregon Citizens 
Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark,51 the court rejected BLM’s argument that 
a situation must be “reasonably probable” to require analysis, holding that 
an agency “may not omit the analysis only because it believes that the worst 
case is unlikely.”52 In Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark,53 the Ninth Circuit read 
Sigler to “emphasize[] that the mere fact that the possibility of an event 
occurring is remote or unlikely does not obviate the necessity to do a worst 
case analysis” and opined that a 1-in-10,000 risk of a catastrophic outcome 
would require analysis.54 
In the wake of these and other cases, pressure mounted on CEQ to 
clarify, amend, or repeal the worst-case regulation to lessen the burden on 
agencies with respect to low-probability environmental risks. Agencies, 
project proponents, and some commentators believed that cases interpret-
ing the regulation were pulling agencies into speculative hypothetical 
scenarios with little practical value.55 In response, CEQ amended its 
regulations in 1986 to rescind the worst-case analysis regulation and replace 
it with a requirement that agencies evaluate “reasonably foreseeable signifi-
cant adverse impacts” of proposed actions, which “includes impacts which 
                                                                                                                      
 49. See id. at 973–74. 
 50. Id. at 975 n.14. 
 51. S. Or. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. (SOCATS) v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
 52. Id. at 1478–79. 
 53. Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 54. Id. at 1245 & n.6. 
 55. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,234, 32,234 
(Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502) (“CEQ is concerned that the require-
ment to prepare a ‘worst case analysis’ in certain circumstances has been the impetus for 
judicial decisions which require federal agencies to go beyond the ‘rule of reason’ in their 
analysis of potentially severe impacts.”); id. at 32,236 (“Many commentators thought that 
either the regulation itself or recent judicial decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit required agencies to go beyond the ‘rule of reason.’ ”). 
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have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is 
low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible 
scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of 
reason.”56 CEQ explained that it rescinded the worst-case requirement 
because it was “an unproductive and ineffective method . . . which can 
breed endless hypothesis and speculation.”57 It linked its amended regula-
tion to the early NEPA case law invoking the “rule of reason” to hold that 
EISs “need not discuss remote and highly speculative consequences.”58 The 
amended regulation is consistent with other NEPA regulations stating that 
federal agencies must examine the “reasonably foreseeable” effects of their 
actions.59 
Since CEQ amended its regulations in 1986 to remove the worst-case 
analysis requirement, courts have addressed questions of what NEPA  
requires with respect to environmental risks and uncertainties with a 
hodgepodge of existing doctrine. Many cases rely on the rule of reason’s 
subsidiary principle that agencies need not analyze “remote and specula-
tive” possible consequences of a proposed agency action. Courts have 
applied this principle in several different ways to limit the scope of impacts 
agencies must consider in their NEPA analyses. 
                                                                                                                      
 56. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,625-26 (Apr. 25, 1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 1502). CEQ initially had attempted to address controversy over the worst-case regulation 
through guidance. See Proposed Guidance Memorandum for Federal Agency NEPA Liai-
sons, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,486 (Aug. 11, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1502 & 1508). 
CEQ proposed guidance would have advised that an agency’s worst-case analysis under the 
regulation “need only examine the reasonably foreseeable effects of its proposed action”—
that is, “there is an initial threshold of probability which must be crossed before Section 
1502.22 comes into play.” Id. at 36,487; see also id. (opining that agencies need not describe in 
their NEPA analyses “speculative information or potential adverse impacts with an extremely 
low probability of occurrence”). CEQ withdrew that proposed guidance in 1984 based on 
public comments received on it. Withdrawal of Proposed Guidance Memorandum of August 
11, 1983, 49 Fed. Reg. 4803 (Feb. 8, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1502 & 1508). 
 57. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,620; see also National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 
50 Fed. Reg. at 32,236 (criticizing the worst-case requirement on the ground that it invited 
agencies to speculate and to engage in a “limitless . . . inquiry”); Modernizing the NEPA 
Process in the Context of the Gulf Disaster, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,147, 11,157 
(Nov. 2010) (reporting Edward A. Boling, Senior Counsel, Council on Environmental 
Quality, as stating that the “purpose in revising that regulation in 1986 was to address a line 
of cases where the courts were increasingly requiring agencies to undertake a wholly specula-
tive analysis that really wasn’t supported by any recent environmental documentation”). 
 58. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,621 (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 
(9th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court upheld the new 
regulation in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354–56 (1989). 
 59. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.8(b) (2010). 
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In some cases, courts hold that NEPA does not require an agency to 
consider a scenario because the chain of causation between the agency 
action and the scenario is too attenuated. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
held that NEPA did not require the Air Force, before approving the instal-
lation of radio towers in Alaska that would be part of a communications 
network during and after a nuclear war, to evaluate the possibility that 
installing the radio towers would increase the probability of nuclear war and 
would be a target in a nuclear war.60 The court reasoned that “the nexus 
between construction of [the radio towers] and nuclear war is too attenuat-
ed to require discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear war in an 
environmental assessment or EIS.”61 
In other cases, courts employ the “remote and speculative” principle to 
hold that NEPA does not require an agency to analyze a possibly catastrophic 
outcome, even though the chain of causation between the proposed agency 
action and the outcome is direct, because the likelihood of the catastrophic 
outcome is very low. The Ninth Circuit thus held that NEPA did not  
require the Navy to assess the environmental consequences of an accidental 
nuclear explosion at a submarine base because the probability of such an 
accident had been determined to be “infinitesimal.”62 
In a third type of case, courts have held that agencies did not have to 
analyze a consequence because the likelihood of the consequence was  
unproven. For example, the Fifth Circuit held that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, in evaluating the consequences of a 
proposed urban redevelopment project that included a new Walmart store, 
did not have to analyze the effects of “additional national retailers attracted 
by Walmart’s presence” because the plaintiffs had not shown “that such 
changes will likely occur or are planned.”63 
Finally, a fourth category of cases hold that uncertainties in how an 
agency action will be implemented through additional future actions render 
                                                                                                                      
 60. See No GWEN Alliance v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385–86 (9th Cir. 1988).  
 61. Id. at 1386; see, e.g., N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that NEPA did not require the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to discuss the consequences of a terrorist attack by an aircraft on a 
nuclear generating facility because “there is no ‘reasonably close causal relationship’ ”  
between the decision to relicense the facility and the risk of a terrorist attack by aircraft); 
Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
National Park Service was not required to discuss the “highly attenuated chain of causation” 
whereby a new public golf clubhouse might compete with an existing private golf clubhouse 
and thereby might result in environmental consequences). 
 62. Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F.3d 
1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 
1026–27 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Army Corps of Engineers did not need to discuss 
the possibility that a catastrophic earthquake could cause a dam to fail where the agency’s 
analysis concluded such a risk was insubstantial).  
 63. Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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a potential impact remote and speculative, and therefore outside of NEPA’s 
mandate. Thus, the Second Circuit held that the Fish and Wildlife Service 
did not have to consider the site-specific impacts of a Depredation Order 
allowing state and local governments to kill double-breasted cormorants, a 
migratory bird, because the Fish and Wildlife Service did not know or 
control the specific circumstances in which state and local governments 
would kill cormorants pursuant to the Order.64 Courts have similarly  
upheld agencies’ decisions not to consider the cumulative impacts of a 
proposed action in combination with other potential future actions on the 
ground that such future actions are speculative until actually planned.65 In 
each of these types of cases, application of the “remote and speculative” 
principle substantially limits the agency’s burden to address environmental 
risks and uncertainties. 
In addition to the “remote and speculative” principle, courts also limit 
the scope of NEPA’s requirements with respect to environmental risks and 
uncertainties by application of rules derived from foundational principles of 
administrative law that mandate deference to reasonably exercised agency 
judgment. Thus, courts tend to treat disagreements over methodology as a 
matter requiring deference to agency expertise, even if there is some uncer-
tainty or risk of error in the agency’s methodological choices. For example, 
when the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Trans-
portation approved the use of the Longhorn Pipeline to transport 
gasoline across Texas, the agencies used statistical analysis to predict the 
risk of pipeline leakage and concluded that the pipeline would not cause 
                                                                                                                      
 64. See Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 
City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 332 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007–08 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding 
that the Army Corps of Engineers, in approving dredging of a shipping channel to a depth 
of forty-five feet, did not have to analyze the possibility that the channel would later be 
dredged to a depth of fifty feet). In many such cases, such as where an agency approves a 
project in multiple phases, the further future actions will trigger additional NEPA analysis. 
See, e.g., id. In some cases, however, such as where state or local governments will take more 
specific implementing actions without additional federal approval, those further actions may 
fall outside of NEPA’s ambit. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 137–38. 
 65. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.20 (1976) (noting that NEPA 
“speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not require an agency to consider the 
possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact state-
ment on proposed actions”); O’Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 477 F.3d 225, 236–38 
(5th Cir. 2007) (holding that NEPA did not require the Army Corps of Engineers to limit 
its NEPA analysis to Phase I of a proposed residential subdivision because the Corps’ 
approval of Phase I did not obligate it to approve future phases); City of Riverview v. 
Surface Transp. Bd., 398 F.3d 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that NEPA did not require 
the Surface Transportation Board, before approving a new intermodal transportation facility, 
to assess the environmental impact of adding river barge service to the terminal in the future 
because, although river barge service was “a long-range possibility,” the facility operator “had 
not developed specific plans” for such service). 
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significant environmental impacts.66 The Fifth Circuit rejected the plain-
tiffs’ challenge to the agencies’ analysis and conclusion on the ground that 
“it was not unreasonable.”67 Such cases, by treating methodological uncer-
tainties as subsumed by the deferential standard of review, effectively  
absolve agencies of an obligation to assess certain environmental risks they 
regard as unlikely but that may be the source of significant uncertainty 
about the environmental impacts of an agency’s proposed action. Other 
courts encountering similar arguments, however, treat disagreements over 
methodology as questions of uncertainty, and rely on NEPA’s “hard look” 
mandate to require the agency to discuss the shortcomings of its chosen 
methodology.68 
These patterns illustrate an overall incoherence in how courts are  
confronting issues of risk and uncertainty in NEPA cases. Without a clear 
and common framework for addressing issues of risk and uncertainty, courts 
are reaching different results in similar cases based on which doctrinal 
principles they emphasize—for example, NEPA’s “hard look” versus the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) deferential standard of review. Even 
where courts are relying on a common doctrine—for example, the “remote 
and speculative” principle—they are applying it in a variety of ways that are 
conceptually diverse and undertheorized, and as a result susceptible to 
results-driven reasoning.69 Because NEPA cases tend to be written with 
fact-intensive and case-specific analysis, the holdings and principles  
announced and applied in these individual decisions do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 244 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 67. Id. (noting that the plaintiffs’ criticisms of the lead agencies’ methodology pre-
sented “a classic battle of the experts” which requires deference to the agencies’ “expert 
judgment”); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 621–24 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding 
agencies’ methodology because “ ‘conflicting scientific evidence’ ” dictated deference to 
agency judgment); Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 68. See Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
Forest Service violated NEPA by not disclosing its methodology’s shortcomings), overruled 
in part by Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
Forest Service need not “affirmatively present every uncertainty” in its methodology, but 
rather “must acknowledge and respond to comments by outside parties that raise significant 
scientific uncertainties and reasonably support that such uncertainties exist”). 
 69. For example, one plausible explanation for the differing results between San Luis 
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that NEPA requires the NRC to consider the environmental effects of a terrorist 
attack on a nuclear energy facility), and New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that NEPA does not 
require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to consider the environmental effects of a 
terrorist attack on a nuclear energy facility), is that the Ninth Circuit panel was more con-
cerned than the Third Circuit panel about the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
energy facility. 
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conflict, but they do reveal an unfortunately fragmented and uncoordinated 
approach to an important and recurring issue in NEPA law. 
Thus, forty years after Congress enacted NEPA and twenty-five years 
after CEQ rescinded its worst-case regulation, confusion persists about how 
agencies are to analyze environmental risks and uncertainties.70 The ques-
tion has received renewed and heightened attention in the wake of two 
recent environmental catastrophes—the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in  
the Gulf of Mexico and the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
reactors in Japan—both of which revealed inadequacies in planning for risks 
regarded ex ante as highly unlikely.71 In light of these recent events,  
respected scholars have proposed reinstating CEQ’s rescinded worst-case 
regulation.72 But although the oil spill and the nuclear disaster have refo-
cused attention on worst-case environmental planning, the problem is one 
that has persisted throughout NEPA’s history without a satisfying or clear 
resolution.73 
III. COMPLICATING FACTORS 
Resurgent calls for incorporating worst-case analysis into NEPA  
appear to be based on an idealized view of environmental planning in the 
face of uncertainties. This Part identifies three complicating factors that 
impair the effectiveness of existing NEPA doctrine but also pose daunting 
                                                                                                                      
 70. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Confronting Uncertainty under NEPA, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, no. 3, 2009, at 1, 7, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/vol8/iss3/art3 
(“There seems to be no clear guidance about when a potential risk becomes so significant 
that it must be acknowledged in the impact statement.”). 
 71. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING 122–27 (2011) (identifying industry and regulatory processes that 
failed to manage risks of catastrophic blowout at BP’s deep water Macondo well); Phred 
Dvorak & Peter Landers, Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, 
at A1 (noting that Fukushima Daiichi’s report on its accident-management protocols stated 
that “[t]he possibility of a severe accident occurring is so small that from an engineering 
standpoint, it is practically unthinkable”); Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Safety Myth’ Left Japan Ripe  
for Nuclear Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1 (“Because of this widespread belief in 
Japanese plants’ absolute safety, plant operators and nuclear regulators failed to adopt proper 
safety measures and advances in technology, like emergency robots, experts and government 
officials acknowledge.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 9 (“CEQ . . . should go back to its original worst-
case analysis requirement. Without it, we now know, federal decisions will ignore some 
major and altogether foreseeable risks.”); McAllister, supra note 9 (arguing that “our deci-
sion-making processes must identify and analyze worst case scenarios” because the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns show that “worst case 
scenarios really can happen”). 
 73. Cf. Farber, supra note 70, at 21 (noting that “the problem of how to handle poten-
tially catastrophic risks has vexed the courts”). 
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obstacles to implementing a rule requiring agencies to include worst-case 
analyses in their NEPA documents. These factors necessitate an approach 
to environmental risks and uncertainties that is contextual and analytically 
focused. 
A. Defining Significance 
One of the attractive features of a rule requiring worst-case analysis is 
that it appears to provide clear guidance for addressing risks and uncertain-
ties, which would represent a marked improvement from the confusion of 
current NEPA law. But although worst-case analysis sounds clear, it is not. 
In fact, it is impossible to establish any clear rule for addressing risks in 
environmental planning because of a conundrum: not all risks are worth 
examining, but it is difficult to distinguish those risks worth examining 
from those that are not. 
Everyone who has grappled with low-probability risks ultimately real-
izes that some risks simply do not warrant evaluation. The overwhelming 
majority of the world’s population continued about its daily routine on 
September 23, 2011, for example, despite the imminent but miniscule risk 
of being hit by a falling NASA satellite.74 The trick, then, is how to define 
what distinguishes a risk worth examining from a risk not worth examining. 
That distinction defies simple or clear definition, and thereby dooms the 
possibility of a bright-line rule for addressing risks.75 The significance of a 
risk depends on the context-specific balance of a variety of factors that 
cannot be reduced to a simple rule.76 
Worst-case scenarios are defined only by the severity of the risk—how 
bad the outcome will be if the risk eventuates. Requiring examination of a 
risk solely on the basis that it constitutes the “worst case” thus ignores 
other parameters such as the magnitude of the risk—the probability that 
the risk will eventuate. Thus, taken literally, a rule requiring analysis of 
worst-case scenarios is premised on the proposition that a risk warrants 
consideration because of its severity, regardless of any other factors. 
Such a proposition does not withstand scrutiny. In some situations, the 
worst-case scenario may pose a significant risk that warrants examination. 
But even where the worst-case scenario threatens horrendously catastrophic 
                                                                                                                      
 74. See Kenneth Chang, Satellite’s Fall Becomes Phenomenon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2011, at A22 (noting that the risk to any particular person from the falling satellite was “on 
the order of 1-in-trillions”). 
 75. Worst-case analysis is, at least on its face, a bright-line rule for addressing risks 
because it purports to specify precisely which outcome—the most severe outcome—the 
agency should consider. 
 76. Cf. Jeffrie Minier, Conjunctive Management of Stream-Aquifer Water Rights; The 
Hubbard Decision, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651, 662 (1998) (“ ‘Significant’ is not an absolute 
characteristic; it is chosen by the user.”). 
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harm, other factors, such as the probability or the uncertainty of the risk, 
matter. There is some possibility, for example, that the Large Hadron  
Collider outside Geneva, Switzerland, could produce a black hole or other 
catastrophic reaction that would destroy the Earth.77 Most nuclear physi-
cists, however, have concluded that such an outcome is so unlikely that the 
risk can be dismissed as insignificant despite the cataclysmic severity of the 
consequence if the risk were to eventuate.78  
The Large Hadron Collider example aptly illustrates a fundamental 
shortcoming of worst-case analysis. Either worst-case analysis requires a 
focus on scenarios so extremely unlikely that most would regard them as 
insignificant, or it requires consideration of factors other than the severity 
of the risk. In other words, worst-case analysis in practice is either unrealistic 
and misguided, or means something different—more complicated and less 
clear—than it facially suggests. 
Recognizing that “worst case” provides a poor measure of the overall 
significance of a risk, efforts have been made to state a rule delineating 
which risks should be addressed in environmental planning and which can 
be omitted. The predominant view is that agencies need only consider low-
probability risks if they are credible and involve catastrophic consequences. 
CEQ’s successor regulation to the worst-case scenario requirement uses 
these criteria, providing that agencies should analyze “impacts which have 
catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, 
provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific 
evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of  
reason.”79 Prominent commentators have expressed support for limiting 
agencies’ obligations with respect to low-probability risks to those that are 
credible and involve catastrophic consequences.80 But neither credibility nor 
                                                                                                                      
 77. See Dennis Overbye, Gauging a Collider’s Odds of Creating a Black Hole, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at F2. 
 78. See, e.g., John Ellis et al., Review of the Safety of LHC Collisions, J. PHYSICS G: 
NUCLEAR & PARTICLE PHYSICS, Nov. 2008, at 1, 2, 3, 12, 17 (2008) (concluding there is “no 
basis for any conceivable threat” from the Large Hadron Collider); Steven B. Giddings & 
Michelangelo L. Mangano, Astrophysical Implications of Hypothetical Stable TeV-Scale Black 
Holes, 78 PHYSICAL REV. D, no. 3, 2008, at 035009-1, 035009-27, available at http://cdsweb. 
cern.ch/record/1111084/files/PhysRevD.78.035009.pdf (studying the potential creation of 
black holes within a Large Hadron Collider and concluding that “there is no risk of any 
significance whatsoever from such black holes”). 
 79. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2011). 
 80. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Through Another’s Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside 
Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 275 (2011) (“Worst-
case analysis need not be required for every project; it is important only when there is an 
uncertain or low probability risk of a disastrous event, like an oil well blowout or a successful 
terrorist attack on a nuclear installation.”); Farber, supra note 70, at 31 (“[T]he agency should 
consider catastrophic outcomes whenever there is a credible argument that they are possible.”). 
  
Spring 2012] A Functional Approach to Risks & Uncertainties Under NEPA 105 
catastrophic severity provides an appropriate threshold for the significance 
of a risk. 
Credibility addresses only the reliability, not the probability, of the  
estimated risk. This is a problem because a credible but highly improbable 
risk may be insignificant. There is, for example, some reliably predicted risk 
of a catastrophic earthquake in Pennsylvania, but the probability of the risk 
is so low that we dismiss such a risk as negligible.81 Thus, the risk of a cata-
strophic earthquake in areas of very low earthquake risk is credible but 
insignificant.82  
Nor is it clear that agencies should address all risks of catastrophic  
outcomes or only risks of catastrophic outcomes. Focusing on catastrophic 
risks is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in that, as 
noted,83 some catastrophic outcomes are so improbable that they can be 
disregarded. It is underinclusive in that there may be other risks that, alt-
hough not necessarily catastrophic, are widely considered significant—for 
example, damage to an important historical landmark. Moreover, although 
some outcomes clearly fall within the definition of catastrophic—the mas-
sive oil spill, the nuclear meltdown, the dam failure—many are not so  
clear. Is the extinction of an obscure species catastrophic? What about the  
flooding of a popular recreational area? Arguably whether a consequence of 
an action is catastrophic—or fits any other classification of risks based on 
severity—depends on diverse factors such as the benefits of the action, 
whether the consequence could have been avoided, how frequently the 
consequence occurs, how visible the consequence is, and even the public’s 
subjective evaluation of the likely consequence.84 A negligent explosion of a 
firework that kills 100 people might be considered catastrophic, for example, 
but a heat wave that kills 100 people might not be.85 
                                                                                                                      
 81. CHARLES K. SCHARNBERGER, EARTHQUAKE HAZARD IN PENNSYLVANIA 14 
(2003). For example, an earthquake that rocked the East Coast in August 2011, although 
unusually large for the region, caused little damage. See Katharine Q. Seelye et al., Above All 
Else, Eastern Quake Rattles Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at A1 (noting “few reports of 
serious damage” from the magnitude 5.8 quake).  
 82. It could be that when we say agencies should focus on “credible” environmental 
risks, we really mean risks of a certain probability as well as reliability. The rule of reason’s 
subsidiary principle that agencies need not examine “speculative” risks may similarly attempt 
to encompass both probability and reliability. But defining risks worthy of attention by 
reference to probability poses problems of its own, in that there is no clear threshold for how 
probable a risk must be to warrant examination. 
 83. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 84. Cf. Minier, supra note 76, at 662 (“The level of significance is chosen by balancing 
the benefits of desired ends against the detriments resulting from a wrong decision.”). 
 85. Environmental disasters that occur after apparently inadequate ex ante attention 
to the risks of catastrophic harm provide one of the primary impetuses for calls to revive the 
worst-case requirement under NEPA. Merely pointing to inadequate NEPA documents 
does not, however, establish that NEPA’s current requirements are inadequate or that a 
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Although the ad hoc approach of existing NEPA law avoids the prob-
lems of a bright-line distinction such as worst-case analysis, it too has 
struggled with defining what risks and uncertainties are significant enough 
to require discussion. NEPA regulations, by limiting the scope of NEPA to 
“reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environ-
ment,”86 essentially employ a test of reasonable foreseeability to distinguish 
between risks that require discussion and risks that do not. This is con-
sistent with other areas of law such as torts and criminal law that widely use 
the term “reasonably foreseeable” to define those risks for which an actor 
should be held accountable.87 
Despite its widespread adoption in the law, however, courts have  
found that operationalizing reasonable foreseeability is extremely difficult.  
Efforts to define what risks are reasonably foreseeable generally invoke the  
notoriously opaque reasonable person standard,88 which essentially renders 
                                                                                                                      
worst-case analysis requirement would improve environmental planning. Poor environmental 
planning may well be, and often is, a problem of slippage in compliance rather than inade-
quate rules. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299 (1999) (defining 
“ ‘negative’ slippage” as “something that is legally mandated [but] simply fails to happen”). 
For example, the Clean Water Act requires owners and operators of oil vessels and facilities 
to prepare response plans that include “a plan for responding, to the maximum extent 
practicable, to a worst case discharge,” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2006), but everyone 
agrees that BP’s worst-case planning fell far short of what the Clean Water Act and its 
implementing regulations require. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON 
OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 71, at 84 (concluding that, despite statutory 
requirements, “neither BP, in crafting its Oil Spill Response Plan for the Gulf of Mexico 
applicable to the Macondo well, nor [the Minerals Management Service] in approving it, 
evidenced serious attention to detail”). BP’s shoddy analysis in the face of the Clean Water 
Act’s worst-case analysis requirement does not support adding such a requirement to NEPA.  
 86. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2011). 
 87. See, e.g., Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 947 N.E.2d 581, 593 
(Mass. App. 2011) (“The ordinary rule is that a tortfeasor is liable for the reasonably fore-
seeable consequences of its actions.”); State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270, 280 (N.J. 1993) (“[A] 
conspirator can be held liable for the acts of others that constitute a reasonably foreseeable 
risk arising out of the criminal conduct undertaken to effectuate the conspiracy, and occur-
ring as the necessary or natural consequences of the conspiracy.”); McKinnon v. United 
States, 550 A.2d 915, 918 (D.C. 1988) (“[A] criminal defendant proximately causes, and thus 
can be held criminally accountable for, all harms that are reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of his or her actions.”). 
 88. See, e.g., City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 n.4 
(8th Cir. 1979) (“A result is reasonably foreseeable if there are indications which would lead 
a reasonably prudent man to know that the particular results could follow from his acts.”). 
For criticisms of the “reasonable person” standard, see, for example, Susan M. Mathews, 
Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 313 
(1991) (criticizing the “reasonable person” standard as “too ambiguous”); Robert Rubinson, 
Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 126 n.18 
(1999) (characterizing the “reasonable person” standard in tort law as context-dependent and 
“classically difficult to define”). 
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the reasonably foreseeable standard circular: risks are reasonably foreseea-
ble if they would be foreseen by a reasonable person. Foreseeability itself 
offers little direction; Prosser and Keeton observed that “the concept of 
foreseeability so completely lacks all clarity and precision that it amounts to 
little more than a convenient formula for disposing of a case—usually by 
leaving it to the jury . . . . ”89 To the extent courts have tried to describe 
reasonable foreseeability more specifically, their guidance merely demon-
strates the muddiness of the waters: a consequence “ ‘need not have been a 
strong probability’ ”90 but must be more than “just a remote possibility.”91 
In addition to objective factors that complicate the significance of risk, 
subjective factors may play an important role as well. Indeed, if the signifi-
cance of a risk depends even in part on how people actually perceive it, then 
risk significance becomes even more difficult to assess. Psychologists have 
found that factors such as voluntariness, controllability, lethality, and fair-
ness affect the significance people assign to risks.92 Research also suggests 
that a person’s cultural worldview affects her perception of risks: 
“[I]ndividuals select certain risks for attention and disregard others in a 
way that reflects and reinforces the particular worldviews to which they 
adhere.”93 
The difficulties and complexities encountered when attempting to  
define what risks and uncertainties are significant, and therefore worthy of 
discussion under NEPA, mirror difficulties that have arisen in other areas 
of the law in defining significant risk. For example, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct)94 to require 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), before 
adopting a standard regulating a toxic material or harmful physical agent, to 
show that the regulated substance poses a significant risk.95 The Court 
recognized, however, that within broad limits, “[OSHA’s] determination 
that a particular level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy 
                                                                                                                      
 89. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 297 (5th ed. 1984). 
 90. People v. Nguyen, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 1 B. E. 
WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 150 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 91. Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 92. Paul Slovic, What’s Fear Got to Do with It? It’s Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 
MO. L. REV. 971, 976 (2004) (citing Peter Sandman, Hazard Versus Outrage in the Public 
Perception of Risk, in EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION: THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
OF GOVERNMENT AND NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 45 (Vincent T. Covello et al. 
eds., 1989)). 
 93. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 149, 154 (2006). For example, a person with an egalitarian viewpoint may be 
sensitive to environmental risk because environmental regulation restricts commercial 
activities that produce social inequality. Id. 
 94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006). 
 95. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639–40 (1980). 
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considerations.”96 As another example, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)97 excludes from its protections disabled individuals who pose a 
“significant risk to the health or safety of others.”98 Four factors define 
significant risk under the ADA: the nature of the risk; the duration of the 
risk; the severity of the risk; and the probability of the risk.99 Thus, both 
the OSHAct and the ADA use significant risk as an important threshold in 
defining the scope of the statute, and in both contexts the term significant 
risk depends on a contextual balancing of multiple factors rather than a 
bright-line rule. 
NEPA analyses should address significant environmental risks and 
should be allowed to disregard risks that are not significant. As the forego-
ing discussion in this Section demonstrates, however, the significance of an 
environmental risk is a judgment that may be a function of several different 
variables. None of these variables by itself can determine the significance of 
a risk. It is the mix of the variables in each particular case that is important. 
These variables include at least the probability of the risk and the severity 
of the risk if it actualizes.100 But it may include other variables as well, such 
as the (un)certainty of the risk. Uncertainty entails incomplete knowledge 
about characteristics of a risk, such as probability or severity, that may bear 
on its significance.101 Uncertainty thus essentially adds an additional layer 
of risk—the risk of erroneous prediction—on top of the risk itself. At a 
sufficient level, that uncertainty may render the risk significant. 
Moreover, each of the variables that determines the significance of a 
risk is itself complicated. The severity of a risk, for example, is difficult to 
evaluate and often involves debatable judgments. For example, NEPA 
regulations identify several factors that influence the intensity or severity 
of an environmental impact, all of which involve contextual judgments.102 
                                                                                                                      
 96. Id. at 655 n.62. The Court opined that a “one in a billion” cancer risk “clearly 
could not be considered significant,” whereas a “one in a thousand” risk of death would 
reasonably be considered significant. Id. at 655. 
 97. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)–(b) (2006). 
 99. See, e.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)). 
 100. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 120 (2007) (arguing that planning 
should consider “both the probability and the severity of worst-case scenarios”). 
 101. See supra note 3 (distinguishing risk and uncertainty). 
 102. The factors include whether the impacts are beneficial or adverse; whether public 
health or safety is affected; whether the effects involve a geographic area with unique charac-
teristics; the extent to which the effects are likely to be controversial; the extent to which the 
effects are uncertain; the extent to which the action may establish a precedent for future 
actions; the extent to which the action is related to other actions that together with the 
action may have cumulatively significant impacts; the extent to which the action may affect 
historic or cultural resources; the extent to which the action may adversely affect endangered 
  
Spring 2012] A Functional Approach to Risks & Uncertainties Under NEPA 109 
The complexity of the considerations that go into determining the signifi-
cance of a risk necessitates a standard that is both contextual and case 
specific and allows consideration of multiple factors such as the magnitude, 
reliability, and severity of the risk.103 
B. Cabining Risk and Uncertainty 
Risks and uncertainty are ubiquitous in environmental planning, mak-
ing it imperative for agencies to address risks and uncertainty in their 
NEPA analyses. But the pervasiveness of risks and uncertainty also poses a 
danger to NEPA implementation, because it means that rules that would 
increase agencies’ responsibilities to address risk and uncertainty have the 
potential to apply very broadly, and thereby pose a danger of overwhelming 
agencies and the public alike with large amounts of additional information. 
Thus, in addition to the obstacles to defining clearly what environmental 
risks are significant enough to require inclusion in an agency’s NEPA  
analysis,104 there is also difficulty in cabining risks and uncertainty. 
Because of the complexity of both human behavior and ecological  
systems, risks and uncertainty pervade environmental planning. Virtually 
every conclusion in an agency’s NEPA analysis involves risks, uncertainty, 
or both.105 These risks and uncertainties arise because the Earth’s ecological 
systems are fundamentally complex and dynamic.106 For example, an agency 
considering a management program for a major river may have to evaluate 
the possibility that the program could result in temporary drawdowns of a 
lake in the river system, which could increase the area of shoreline exposed, 
                                                                                                                      
species or their habitats; and whether the action threatens a violation of federal, state, or 
local environmental law. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (2011). 
 103. Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 18 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“Ultimately, of 
course, whether a particular combination of slight risk and great harm, or great risk and 
slight harm, constitutes a danger must depend on the facts of each case.”); 1 THOMAS 
STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906) (“It is unfortunate that no 
definite principle can be laid down by which to determine this question [of proximate 
cause]. It is always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of 
logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.”); Paolo F. Ricci & Lawrence S. Molton, 
Risk and Benefit in Environmental Law, 214 SCIENCE 1096, 1097 (1981) (observing that the 
point at which a risk becomes significant “must require case-by-case determination”). 
 104. See supra Part III.A. 
 105. See Karkkainen, supra note 24, at 926 (noting that “information about the envi-
ronmental consequences of our actions is . . . typically scarce, costly to assemble, highly 
uncertain, and variable in quality”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 333, 350 (2004) (“[B]ecause ecological processes are complex and typically less 
than fully understood, [ex ante scientific] predictions [about the environmental consequences 
of a proposed action] are often highly uncertain.”); Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning 
Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265, 267 (2009) (“Throughout environ-
mental management, agencies also confront pervasive uncertainties.”). 
 106. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 6 (2004). 
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which could cause sediments from the exposed shoreline to dry out and 
become airborne through wind action, which, if the sediments are contami-
nated and if they are inhaled by humans, could pose a hazard to human 
health.107 In addition, environmental consequences often depend on pat-
terns of human behavior that are difficult to predict. For example, an 
agency approving funds for a new highway may have to evaluate the  
possibility that the new road will induce residential and industrial growth, 
which may in turn increase demands on local sewage treatment facilities.108 
An agency approving construction of an updated airport terminal may have 
to predict what effect, if any, the new terminal will have on airport use 
years into the future.109 
Given the pervasiveness of risks and uncertainties, each of which  
requires a judgment or assumption about how it ought to be addressed, a 
worst-case analysis would quickly spiral out of control as judgment piled 
upon judgment upon judgment. More broadly, the pervasiveness of risks 
and uncertainty renders the option of complete analysis and transparency 
with respect to risk and uncertainty practically unattainable. Thus, agencies 
cannot be required to disclose and discuss every possibility and uncertainty 
in their analyses. Such a practice would swamp NEPA documents with 
overwhelming detail and dramatically increase the costs of NEPA compli-
ance, which are already often criticized as excessive.110 It also would drown 
the public in far more information than it could feasibly absorb in any 
meaningful way.111 
                                                                                                                      
 107. 1 WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE COLUMBIA RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 5-2 to 
5-3 (2007). 
 108. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676–77 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 109. City of Los Angeles v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806, 807–08 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 110. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE NAT’L ENVTL. POLICY ACT, 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AND UPDATE THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT 12–13 (2006); Karkkainen, supra note 105, at 340–41. 
 111. In an analogous context, commentators have noted the danger that including too 
much information on a product-warning label or in doctors’ disclosures of risks to patients 
can overwhelm the consumer or patient, undermining the purpose of the warning or disclo-
sure. See, e.g., Alan Meisel, From Tragedy to Catastrophe: Lawyers and the Bureaucratization of 
Informed Consent, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 479, 482 (2006) (“[I]nformed 
consent can become an exercise in ‘information dumping.’ Overload the patient with infor-
mation, thereby complying with the letter of the law but undermining the idea of informed 
consent.”); Martha Minow, Telling Medical Stories: Sharing Information Among Doctors, Patients, 
and Families, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 903, 920 (1992) (“It is possible that physicians at times may 
tell too much information . . . . [F]ull disclosure of information—complete with probabilities 
and uncertainties—may engender no increased sense of control for patients.”); W. Kip 
Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 625, 665 (1995) (“[T]here is a potential danger of information overload from the 
increase in the amount of information and the diversity of risks included in the warning.”). 
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Increasing the informational burden on agencies to address risks and 
uncertainty in their NEPA analyses should be of particular concern because 
there is already widespread agreement that increasing the amount of infor-
mation in EISs and Environmental Assessments does not necessarily 
improve them, and in fact often makes them less effective.112 There is a 
difference between forcing agencies to discuss a point and actually inducing 
agencies to engage critically with an issue, and NEPA succeeds more at the 
former than the latter. Indeed, criticisms are often heard that NEPA  
analyses are merely prepared to defend against litigation113 and that NEPA 
does little more than increase the transaction costs for agency action.114 
Even if overstated, these criticisms highlight the need for an approach to 
risks and uncertainties that produces information of a type and in a form 
that effectuates NEPA’s purposes. 
NEPA case law currently balances requirements that agencies disclose 
risks and uncertainties with the need to avoid excessive discussion, but it is 
not clear that the existing balance is either stable or reasoned. As explained 
in Part II, NEPA cases address issues of risk and uncertainty with an  
uneasy and arguably incoherent mix of competing doctrines. On the one 
hand, courts can invoke NEPA’s “hard look” mandate and CEQ’s regulations 
to require agencies to disclose the uncertainties associated with the agency’s 
                                                                                                                      
 112. See, e.g., Flournoy et al., supra note 28, at 1582–83 (noting that NEPA case law has 
tended to “encourage agencies to gold-plate their EISs by including every conceivably 
relevant piece of information to avoid reversal,” resulting in “overly lengthy documents that 
are less valuable than more concise, focused documents would be”). 
 113. See, e.g., Jamison E. Colburn, The Cynic at the Circus, 45 TULSA L. REV. 307, 323 
n.135 (2009) (“NEPA arguably encourages agencies to ‘bullet proof’ their NEPA documents 
in anticipation of litigation, not necessarily to improve their predictive capacities.”); Michael 
Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1700 
(1993) (“EISs are crammed with long, often boilerplate, discussions that are not meaningfully 
informative but are included mainly as a defense against subsequent litigation.”); David C. 
Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12–0 Record, 20 
ENVTL. L. 551, 567 (1990) (“EISs prepared in anticipation of litigation tend to be uncreative 
and merely defensible rather than environmentally sound, which frustrates NEPA.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 105, at 341 (“[T]he EIS process is by its very 
nature so inefficient and cumbersome that it may be used to thwart or constrain agency 
decision-making through selective, tactical application of extreme transaction costs.”); David 
B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of 
Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 425 n.72 (1997) (“NEPA is generally understood to 
have had little substantive effect on agency decisions, except for the increased transaction 
costs due to NEPA compliance that may effectively kill marginal agency projects.”). But see 
Jason J. Czarnecki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, Adminis-
trative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 27 n.124 
(2005) (questioning “whether explanation in the NEPA process results in the same ‘ossify-
ing’ concerns as in the informal rulemaking context”). 
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prediction of impacts.115 On the other hand, courts can defer to the agency’s 
reasonable judgment in the face of uncertainty, citing rules derived from 
foundational principles of administrative law that mandate deference to 
reasonably exercised agency judgment.116 These coexisting but conflicting 
principles achieve a workable balance between requiring discussion of risks 
and uncertainties and not overburdening agencies, but it is an ad hoc and 
haphazard balance because few cases attempt to reconcile the conflicting 
principles in any kind of thoughtful way. 
C. Counteracting Biases 
The two problems discussed so far—the difficulty in defining what 
risks are significant enough to warrant discussion and the difficulty in 
cabining risks and uncertainties—present conceptual obstacles to creating a 
clear legal rule for how agencies should consider risks and uncertainties  
in their NEPA analyses. These obstacles have important practical conse-
quences for environmental planning, but at their root they arise from 
conceptual problems. Risks and uncertainties also present difficulties that 
are more directly practical, derived from the unavoidable biases of the 
actors involved. 
Two discrete but interrelated factors create these biases. First, agencies 
and interested members of the public have predispositions toward favoring 
or opposing projects. These predispositions give them strong incentives to 
use information about a proposed action’s environmental consequences for 
strategic advantage in marshaling public support or opposition to the pro-
ject and in preparing for litigation about the project.117 Such effects create 
intentional biases in the information produced and disseminated about 
proposed agency actions. Second, psychological factors lead both agencies 
and interested members of the public to process information about a pro-
posed action differently from what one would expect of perfectly rational 
actors. Such effects create unintentional biases in the information available 
about a project. Together, these intentional and unintentional biases limit 
the ability and willingness of agencies and the public to engage construc-
tively on low-probability risks such as worst-case scenarios. These biases 
                                                                                                                      
 115. See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1380 (9th 
Cir. 1998); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2010).  
 116. See supra note 66-68 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Dick Carter, West Bear Rises Again, HIGH UINTAS PRES. COUNCIL (High 
Uintas Pres. Council, Hyrum, U.T.), Sept. 2008, available at http://www.hupc.org/Archive/ 
newsletters/September%202008/westbeara.htm (using information from an EIS to rally 
opposition to a proposed timber sale); Mary River Mine: Another Challenge to Walrus Habitat, 
WORLD WIDE WALRUS WEB (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.worldwidewalrusweb.com/tag/ 
baffin-island/ (using information from an EIS to rally opposition to a proposed mining 
project). 
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also suggest that worst-case analysis and other proposals that would merely 
require additional information disclosure are unlikely to effectuate NEPA’s 
goal of promoting informed decision making. Instead, NEPA needs to 
focus on counteracting agency and public biases more directly. 
1. Agency Biases 
A variety of factors may influence an administrative agency considering 
a proposed project to underestimate or underweight, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, the possibility that the action will result in an adverse 
environmental consequence. These factors are particularly acute for analyses 
with significant levels of risk and uncertainty, where the consequences of a 
proposed action are unclear. Together, these factors make it difficult to 
induce agencies to examine and to disclose in full the risks and uncertain-
ties associated with a proposed action. 
First, an agency may in bad faith attempt to garner support for and 
undermine opposition to a favored proposed action by understating or not 
discussing the risk of an adverse environmental consequence from the  
action. Complaints of agency bad faith are common, although not often 
successfully proven, in NEPA cases.118 Agencies undoubtedly face some 
incentive to understate environmental risks. An agency may purposefully 
downplay the possibility of an adverse environmental impact to avoid nega-
tive publicity or having to confront adverse consequences of its preferred 
course of action. NEPA’s focus on ex ante predictions, and lack of continu-
ing verification or monitoring of the accuracy of those predictions,119 
increases the incentive for optimistic forecasting. Agencies’ incentives to 
understate risks and uncertainties are especially strong for actions that are 
unlikely to lead to litigation, and therefore judicial scrutiny. Even when 
litigation is possible or likely, the deferential standards of judicial review 
that govern in administrative law cases may give agencies reason to believe 
that their NEPA analyses will not be overturned despite neglecting some 
possible environmental harms. Areas of uncertainty create especially attrac-
tive opportunities for concealing risks of adverse consequences, because 
judgments in the face of uncertainty are a type of agency decision to which 
courts generally defer.120  
                                                                                                                      
 118. See, e.g., Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 433 F.3d 772, 780–81 
(10th Cir. 2006); Wildlaw v. U.S. Forest Serv., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1261 (M.D. Ala. 2007); 
Australians for Animals v. Evans, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 119. Karkkainen, supra note 105, at 344 (noting that NEPA requirements are “purely 
predictive in character” and that “[t]he emphasis is not on actual impacts, but on predicted 
impacts”). 
 120. See, e.g., Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The 
‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is particularly deferential in matters implicating predic-
tive judgments and interim regulations.”); Marita, 46 F.3d at 623 (upholding agencies’ 
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Second, all of the traditional concerns about agency bias against the 
general public interest,121 such as the agency capture thesis,122 would sup-
port the hypothesis that agencies tend to downplay the adverse 
environmental impacts of their proposed actions to avoid stimulating public 
opposition to favored policies. Indeed, NEPA itself seems to some extent 
to “assume[] as inevitable an institutional bias within an agency proposing a 
project,” and to reduce such bias requires agencies to conduct their NEPA 
analyses before reaching a decision on a project.123 The idea that agencies 
will shirk their NEPA responsibilities when they are able is consistent with 
critiques of NEPA contending that, because NEPA has been interpreted as 
procedural rather than substantive, agencies treat their NEPA analyses as 
window dressing without truly integrating environmental concerns into 
their decision-making processes.124 
Despite the incentives and opportunities for intentional bias, one 
would hope and expect that agencies generally act in good faith, consistent 
with the well-established presumption that public officials will properly 
                                                                                                                      
methodology because “ ‘conflicting scientific evidence’ ” created uncertainty and made 
judicial deference to agency methodology appropriate); New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 
1150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We are particularly deferential when reviewing agency actions 
involving policy decisions based on uncertain technical information.”). 
 121. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
1041, 1044 (2011) (“Of course, with any administrative agency, there are the usual concerns 
of capture and bias.”). 
 122. The agency capture thesis posits that a regulatory agency “becomes closely identi-
fied with and dependent upon the industry it is charged with regulating.” Thomas W. 
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1060 (1997) 
(reviewing the historical development of academic literature supporting the agency capture 
thesis); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–24 (2010) (citing reasons that contribute to agency capture); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 
1713 (1975) (“It has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by 
academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the comparative 
overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision results in 
a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 123. See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Envtl. Def. 
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of the U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1972)). 
 124. See, e.g., Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: 
Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA's Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 229 (1992) 
(contending that “the erosion of NEPA's substantive foundation has caused once-sound 
procedures to become ineffective”); Karkkainen, supra note 24, at 906 n.10 (noting the 
common critique “that NEPA is ineffective because it lacked substantive bite from the 
outset”); Erin C. Perkins, Comment, Migratory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Rejuvenate America's National Environmental Policy, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 817, 839 (1998) (contending that NEPA has become a “mere procedural weapon[] that 
federal agencies like the Forest Service have learned to manipulate in order to evade the pro-
conservation policy initially codified by Congress”); The National Environmental Policy Act 
40th Anniversary Symposium, supra note 24, at 11,195 (transcribing an unidentified audience 
member’s comment that  “NEPA is procedural, it is in many instances window-dressing”). 
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discharge their official duties.125 But good faith is not the same as lack of 
bias, and good faith does not guarantee compliance with applicable  
requirements. Several factors may induce bias in agencies that leads them, 
despite acting in good faith to implement NEPA, to downplay environ-
mental risks. 
For most agencies, environmental protection is but one of many goals 
Congress has charged the agency with pursuing.126 Indeed, environmental 
protection is often a secondary goal, perceived to be at odds with the agen-
cy’s other, primary goals.127 Such situations create a strong incentive for 
agencies to take an optimistic view of the environmental consequences of a 
proposed project, thereby avoiding or reducing the conflict between envi-
ronmental protection and other goals.128 Denying or downplaying the 
possibility of an adverse environmental outcome allows the agency to pursue 
its other goals with fewer constraints.129 Optimism avoids the dilemma 
posed by a tradeoff. 
Moreover, making environmental protection a substantive goal may 
have the counterintuitive consequence of making agencies more likely to 
underestimate the possibility of adverse environmental consequences.  
Designating environmental protection as a goal means that adverse envi-
ronmental impacts become a form of project failure. It is human nature to 
believe in, and indeed to place excessive confidence in, one’s likelihood of 
                                                                                                                      
 125. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 296 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 
63, 73 (1929); United States v. Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926). This presumption 
can only be overcome by clear evidence and an affirmative showing that the public official 
acted improperly. Lewis, 279 U.S. at 73; Chem. Found., 272 U.S. at 14–15. 
 126. See Biber, supra note 25, at 7–9 (noting “[t]he [u]biquity of [m]ultiple-[g]oal 
[a]gencies”). 
 127. Cf. id. at 6–30 (describing the tendency of multiple-goal agencies to focus on 
certain primary goals at the expense of secondary goals). 
 128. Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(noting the need for “particularly stringent review of procedural compliance with NEPA . . . 
when the agency involved does not include environmental protection within its primary 
mission”). 
 129. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers recently approved the dredging of 
millions of tons of sand and gravel from the Missouri River for commercial use. U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, RECORD OF DECISION FOR AUTHORIZATION OF COMMERCIAL SAND 
AND GRAVEL DREDGING ON THE LOWER MISSOURI RIVER (2011), available at 
http://www.nwk.usace.army.mil/regulatory/Dredging/MO/ROD2011/ROD_31Mar2011.pdf. 
The Corps’ EIS concluded that the project could proceed “while keeping the risk of future 
[river] bed degradation to a minor or slight level,” a finding that freed the Corps to approve 
the dredging while still certifying its compliance with environmental standards. U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSOURI RIVER COMMERCIAL DREDGING FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT, at ES-6 (2011), available at http://www.nwk.usace.army.mil/ 
regulatory/Dredging/MO/FEIS2011/FEIS00.02_Summary.pdf. Even if the Corps’ predic-
tion of the environmental impacts was accurate, the Corps clearly faced an incentive to 
conclude that the environmental impacts would be slight. 
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success.130 People believe, for example, that they are less likely than others 
to be affected by a risk.131 This optimism bias is stronger for low-probability 
hazards and hazards thought to be controllable,132 both characteristics that 
apply to many environmental risks. Indeed, research shows that people 
approach environmental risks with “tremendous wishful thinking.”133 Agen-
cies operating with a goal to mitigate environmentally harmful 
consequences therefore are likely to discount the possibility that they will 
cause such adverse environmental impacts, because to cause them would be 
to fail. 
Agencies also may act with excessive optimism where environmental 
risks have not eventuated from similar previous decisions. People judge the 
likelihood of an event based on how easy it is to imagine or recall, which 
can lead them to underestimate the risk of an event that has not occurred 
but may occur (known as the availability heuristic).134 Accordingly, where 
prior agency actions have not resulted in an adverse environmental conse-
quence, agency staff is likely to downplay the possibility that the risk of the 
consequence will eventuate for a similar future action. 
2. Public Bias 
Just as it would be naïve to assume that agencies act impartially with 
regard to their proposed actions, the public, too, is often far from neutral in 
its response. In particular, major agency decisions often evoke strong  
responses from the public either in support of or in opposition to a proposed 
action. Those who support a proposed action may consider NEPA a source 
of unnecessary delay and an annoying procedural hurdle. For those who 
oppose a proposed action, NEPA presents an important opportunity  
to raise questions and generate information about the possible adverse 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See, e.g., Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism 
Undermines Executives' Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2003, at 56 (noting that “the 
tendency toward optimism is unavoidable”). 
 131. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 366 (2000); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimis-
tic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989); Neil D. Weinstein & William 
M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 132, 132 (1995).  
 132. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, supra note 131, at 1232. 
 133. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Com-
mons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 258-59 (2000); see also id. at 264 (noting that “most people assume 
that they will be able to avoid, reduce, or ameliorate future risks”). 
 134. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 
1982); SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 54–60; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: 
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra, 
at 163, 163–64. 
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consequences of a project for which the publicity may otherwise be over-
whelmingly favorable—actions that effectuate NEPA’s purposes. 
But NEPA also presents an opportunity for opponents “to throw up 
procedural roadblocks” and “to raise the financial and political costs of 
projects they oppose and stretch out decisions over an extended time frame, 
giving time to rally political opposition” and sometimes generating enough 
costs “to derail the project entirely.”135 When project opponents use NEPA 
in this manner, they turn it into a “tool of unprincipled obstructionism.”136 
Environmental risks often are a source of both genuine anxiety and  
political opportunity for project opponents. For all the reasons discussed 
above, project opponents may distrust agencies’ evaluation of the environ-
mental risks of a proposed project. Project opponents may believe that the 
agency is deliberately or negligently understating significant risks of  
adverse consequences from its proposed action. Countering what they 
perceive as misinformation from the agency is accordingly often a high 
priority for project opponents.137 Moreover, highlighting a severe possible 
consequence can be a powerful persuasive tool to rally public opposition, 
even if the risk of the consequence is quite low.138  
The psychology of risk perception is such that the line between honest 
fears and cynical manipulation of environmental risks is not as clear as it 
first seems. Psychological research has found that “responses to uncertain 
situations appear to have an all-or-none characteristic that is sensitive to 
the possibility rather than the probability of strong positive or negative 
                                                                                                                      
 135. Karkkainen, supra note 105, at 339–40. Karkkainen terms the project opponent 
who uses NEPA for this purpose the “NEPA monkey wrencher.” Id. at 339. 
 136. Id. at 341. See generally id. at 340-41 (noting that, “[w]hen used in this way, NEPA 
is largely a negative weapon—an obstructionist tool” and that “the EIS process is by its very 
nature so inefficient and cumbersome that it may be used to thwart or constrain agency 
decision-making through selective, tactical application of extreme transaction costs”). 
 137. See, e.g., OCEAN MAMMAL INST., WHY THE NAVY'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE 
SAFETY OF LFAS ARE SCIENTIFICALLY FLAWED (2001), available at http://www. 
oceanmammalinst.com/navyconclusionsflawed.html (detailing the Institute’s allegations that 
“[t]he scientific reasoning behind the Navy's conclusions in their EIS . . . that Low Frequen-
cy Active Sonar (LFAS) is safe are scientifically flawed”). 
 138. For example, opponents of the Department of Energy’s planned repository for 
spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain in Nevada attempted to foment opposition to the 
facility by, among other things, highlighting catastrophic accidents that could occur in 
transporting the fuel by rail to Nevada. See ‘Glow Train’ Goes National, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 
29, 2008, 2:10 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jun/29/glow-train-goes-
national/. The Department of Energy’s risk analysis concluded that even a highly unlikely 
severe rail accident involving transportation casks of spent nuclear fuel—an accident involving 
a “long duration, high-temperature fire that would engulf a cask”—would pose only very low 
health risks. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A RAIL ALIGNMENT FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF A RAILROAD IN NEVADA TO A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY 
AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY, NEVADA 4-342 to 4-344 (2008). 
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consequences, causing very small probabilities to carry great weight.”139 
Scholars call this effect probability neglect.140 
Whether motivated by an honest belief that risks are more serious than 
what the agency acknowledges or by a cynical decision to lob any available 
critique to defeat a project they oppose, project opponents have every  
incentive to publicize the risks of adverse consequences. If they can use 
NEPA to force the agency itself to identify such risks, all the better. More-
over, project opponents have every reason to focus on the severity of the 
risk rather than its likelihood. Project opponents can thus become “worst-
case entrepreneurs, attempting to ensure that people consider the worst 
that might happen,”141 either because they believe the worst actually might 
happen or because, in heated public debate, the distinction between a slim 
possibility and a likely result may be lost. 
Integrating the agency and opponent perspectives, it is apparent why 
environmental risks present such a quandary for attempts to improve the 
quality of information and discourse about environmental risks and uncer-
tainties. On the one hand, there seems to be ample basis for questioning 
agencies’ willingness and ability to fully investigate and disclose possible 
adverse consequences of their proposed actions that they regard, and have 
strong incentive to regard, as unlikely and perhaps exceedingly unlikely. On 
the other hand, members of the public may seize on environmental risks, 
even those that are highly unlikely, to build opposition to a proposed  
action, and in doing so may focus on the severity of a risk’s consequence 
rather than its low probability of occurrence. Discussing uncertainties is 
thus important to informed decision making but also “provides ammunition 
to project opponents.”142 There is “a difficult balance between alerting and 
informing people about serious risks and creating exaggerated and harmful 
fears.”143 
In light of these dynamics, neither a rule requiring worst-case analysis 
nor the existing ad hoc mix of doctrine provides a beneficial solution. Pro-
ject opponents are likely to misrepresent or misunderstand the results of 
worst-case analyses, and in any event agencies facing every incentive to 
approach risks and uncertainties with optimism are likely to exhibit  
                                                                                                                      
 139. Slovic, supra note 92, at 982 (citing George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 
127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 276 (2001)); see also id. (noting that “societal concerns about 
hazards . . . fail to recede in response to information about the very small probabilities of the 
feared consequences from such hazards”). 
 140. SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 26, 60–63. 
 141. Id. at 26–27. Sunstein refers to government officials who focus attention on the 
risks of terrorism, but the description applies equally well in this context. 
 142. Farber, supra note 70, at 32. Farber, citing the benefits of “a candid discussion of 
the limits of the agency’s ability to predict the future,” does not think this is necessarily an 
adverse result. Id. 
 143. Slovic, supra note 92, at 984. 
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extreme resistance to worst-case analysis. Worst-case analysis, by attempting 
to force agencies to focus on extreme scenarios without regard to whether 
they actually pose a significant risk, is therefore likely to exacerbate the 
biases and intransigence of both agencies and project opponents. Existing 
doctrine, on the other hand, is both too stringent and too lax: too lax when 
it simply defers to agency judgment, and too stringent when it reflexively 
invokes the “hard look” mandate to require discussion of a risk or uncer-
tainty. 
CONCLUSION: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE 
The three complicating factors discussed in Part III undermine the  
rationales for attempting to address risks and uncertainties in environmental 
planning with a worst-case analysis requirement. First, worst-case scenarios 
are too conceptually ambiguous and slippery to form the basis for legal 
requirements that would bind agencies. Conceptual ambiguity would beget 
legal indeterminacy; worst-case analysis’s supposed bright-line rule would 
become anything but. Second, risks and uncertainties are too pervasive in 
environmental planning to require across-the-board discussion of them in 
NEPA analyses, as worst-case analysis would appear to require. Moreover, 
such a requirement, insofar as it invites questioning agencies over every 
methodological judgment they make (because every such judgment is a 
potential source of uncertainty), is in tension with fundamental principles 
of deference to agency decision making. Third, both agencies and members 
of the public face strong incentives to downplay (in the case of agencies) or 
to magnify (in the case of opponents) possible consequences of agency 
action that are unlikely but would be severe if they were to eventuate.  
These incentives make it unlikely that agencies and the public will engage 
constructively on low-probability risks like worst-case scenarios. 
In sum, environmental risks and uncertainties are ill suited to a  
bright-line rule such as worst-case analysis and instead require a more 
context-sensitive approach that better reflects the complex interplay of eco-
logical processes, patterns of human behavior, and administrative politics 
that drives NEPA implementation. A functional approach to addressing 
risks and uncertainties in NEPA analysis would take into account and  
respond to the challenges identified in this Article. A functional approach 
would not necessarily differ dramatically from current NEPA case law. 
Both current NEPA law and a functional approach emphasize case-specific 
context over bright-line rules, and both effect a balance that reflects the 
significance of risks and uncertainties to environmental planning but also 
attempts to avoid overwhelming agencies and the public with additional 
information. That being said, the functional approach this Article proposes 
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would improve NEPA’s treatment of risks and uncertainties in some signif-
icant respects by adding analytical focus to improve the clarity and 
functionality of NEPA’s treatment of risks and uncertainties. In short, it 
would have advantages over both a bright-line worst-case analysis require-
ment and the doctrinal hodgepodge of current NEPA law. 
First, requirements for addressing risks and uncertainties under NEPA 
must focus on identifying characteristics of risks that make them significant 
and therefore worth considering, instead of pretending that the “worst 
case” or “reasonably foreseeable” standards provide useful guidance. The 
significance of a risk depends on a contextual balancing of at least three 
variables: (a) the probability of the risk; (b) the severity of the risk; and (c) 
the uncertainty associated with the probability and/or severity.144 Consider-
ation of these variables should guide an agency’s determinations as to which 
risks and uncertainties it should address in its NEPA analysis. The varia-
bles need not be quantifiable to be considered. Indeed, assessing individual 
variables, in particular the severity of a risk, may require evaluation of 
numerous complex factors.145 A threshold test for significant risk that  
focuses explicitly on the characteristics of probability, severity, and  
uncertainty represents an important improvement over both “worst case,” 
which focuses solely on the severity of the risk, and the current focus on 
“reasonable foreseeability,” which as explained above is widely recognized as 
indeterminate.146 
Arrays of statistical and analytical techniques exist to characterize risks 
and uncertainties. Monte Carlo simulations, for example, use a range of 
values for each uncertain variable to calculate a range of possible outcomes 
and the relative probabilities that they will occur.147 The Monte Carlo 
method is a powerful tool for quantitatively characterizing uncertainty, but 
it requires quantitative data and assumptions about the probability distribu-
tions associated with uncertain variables. As another example, where the 
                                                                                                                      
 144. Although some scholars have posited that credibility is an important determinant 
of whether a risk bears examination, this Article criticizes its usefulness to that inquiry. See 
supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. To the extent credibility has any utility in the 
inquiry, it is either subsumed in the factors identified or it does not have distinctive  
importance to the significance of a risk—in other words, every determination, regardless of 
whether it involves risk or uncertainty, should favor information that is credible. 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
 146. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. That being said, the three-variable 
standard for significance does not require abandoning reasonable foreseeability. To facilitate 
adoption of the three-factor standard for significance without appearing to reject existing 
regulations or case law, courts could characterize the three-factor standard as an approach to 
assessing reasonable foreseeability, clarifying this problematic concept. 
 147. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & Peter Glynn, Efficient Monte Carlo Simulation of Security 
Prices, 5 ANNALS APPLIED PROBABILITY 897 (1995); Michael P. Hanratty & Francis S. Stay, 
Field Evaluation of the Littoral Ecosystem Risk Assessment Model’s Predictions of the Effects of 
Chlorpyrifos, 31 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 439 (1994). 
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range of possible outcomes can be determined but the relative probabilities 
of outcomes along the range cannot be ascertained, -maximin models call 
for simply weighting the best possible and worst possible outcomes, thereby 
allowing decision makers to balance “our hopes (for the best case) and our 
fears (of the worst case).”148 Some analytical techniques require quantified 
data, some do not. Some are resource intensive and time consuming, some 
are not. As with risks and uncertainties generally, there is no single method 
appropriate for all NEPA analyses that encounter risks and uncertainties. 
Determining what statistical and analytical methods are well suited to an 
agency’s situation thus will always depend on context. But context sensi-
tivity should not give agencies complete discretion in choosing their 
approaches to characterizing uncertainty. It is reasonable to require agen-
cies to assess and explain their approaches to risks and uncertainties, 
especially where an agency has declined to avail itself of a potentially useful 
method specifically proposed by a commenter. Agencies and CEQ can 
promote thoughtful discussions by developing a menu of potentially useful 
methods, including a summary of the requirements and relative advantages 
of each method. 
Second, to give analytical focus and avoid NEPA’s tendency to generate 
information rather than thoughtful consideration, agencies’ discussions of 
risks and uncertainties should focus on their relationship to the ultimate 
decision facing the agency. As this Article has argued throughout, risks and 
uncertainties do not lend themselves to a uniform approach. There are 
many different sources and types of risk or uncertainty in agency decision 
making: some that arise from natural variation, some that arise from  
unpredictable human behavior, some that arise from limited information due 
to resource constraints, and some that arise from imperfect understanding 
of complex systems and processes. There are, moreover, multiple ways in 
which risks and uncertainties may bear on an agency’s decision making: 
they may be relevant to whether to take an action, to deciding what precau-
tions to take if the agency takes the action, to selecting adaptive 
management strategies for mitigating risks that do eventuate, and to pre-
paring and planning for catastrophic emergencies. Each of these purposes 
may be more or less important depending on the specific circumstances of 
the situation before the agency.149 This variability necessitates flexibility. 
                                                                                                                      
 148. Farber, supra note 3, at 930. 
 149. Moreover, sometimes independent requirements from other statutes may address 
some of these potential purposes. For example, the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act 
require emergency planning for worst-case oil spills and chemical accidents, respectively. 33 
U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2006) (requiring owners and operators of tank vessels and facili-
ties to prepare response plans that include “a plan for responding, to the maximum extent 
practicable, to a worst case discharge”); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (2006) (requiring 
hazard assessment for chemical accidents that “shall include an evaluation of worst case 
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Differences in the mix of sources and types of risk and different types of 
relevance to the agency’s decision warrant different treatment in the agen-
cy’s NEPA document. Planning for an emergency response to an oil spill is 
different from monitoring airline passengers to prevent importation of 
invasive alien species, even if both are significant risks worthy of attention 
in an agency’s environmental planning. Mere disclosure of significant risks 
and uncertainties is not necessarily adequate; agencies should focus on how 
their consideration of risks and uncertainties can improve their decision 
making. 
Focusing more closely and explicitly on the relationship between the 
risk or uncertainty and the decision before the agency both limits and 
deepens the requirements on the agency. On the one hand, NEPA should 
not require much if anything with respect to a risk or uncertainty that has 
limited significance to the agency’s ultimate decision—for example, uncer-
tainty about which of two methodologies is more accurate, where both yield 
similar results. On the other hand, when a risk or uncertainty is important 
to an agency’s decision—such as when a significant outcome is very sensi-
tive to an uncertain variable—it should be discussed in the agency’s 
evaluation of the impacts and alternatives, not buried in the agency’s meth-
odological description. 
Just as NEPA is premised overall on the hope that requiring agencies 
to consider environmental consequences will lead them to reduce adverse 
environmental impacts, one can hope that requiring agencies to consider 
environmental risks and uncertainties will affect their treatment of risks 
and uncertainties. Focusing more explicitly on the relationship of risks and 
uncertainties to the decision before the agency would help to increase the 
relevance of the discussion of risks and uncertainties. For example, promi-
nently disclosing uncertainty in its decision analysis may induce an agency 
to engage in monitoring so that it can take corrective action if a risk even-
tuates. An appropriate model for a disclosure requirement that provides 
useful analytical focus may be the Securities and Exchange Commmission 
(SEC) guidance that provides a dual approach to addressing uncertainties 
                                                                                                                      
accidental releases”). To take another example, Clean Water Act regulations require some 
operators of cooling water intake structures to monitor certain environmental parameters 
and to take corrective action when those parameters are not meeting expectations. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 125.95(b)(4)(ii) (2010). These requirements operate independent of NEPA, but depending 
on the circumstance they may provide a mechanism for addressing aspects of environmental 
risks that agencies and ultimately courts should appropriately take into account in deciding 
what NEPA requires with respect to such risks. A requirement that an agency or permittee 
monitor and take corrective action, for example, may sufficiently protect against an envi-
ronmental risk that the agency may appropriately conclude in its NEPA analysis is 
insignificant. 
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in corporate 10-K filings.150 In addition to requirements for specific risks 
and uncertainties underlying a business’s financial statements, the SEC also 
requires businesses to highlight and discuss the implications for their over-
all financial condition of key uncertainties that rise to the level of critical 
accounting estimates and assumptions.151 Current NEPA law, insofar as it 
has been read merely to require disclosure of risks and uncertainties, too 
easily allows the discussion to be buried among other voluminous methodo-
logical trivia, off the radar screen of the agency decision makers and the 
public. 
Third, procedural standards that apply to agencies and to the interested 
public should be vigorously enforced to counteract biases and reduce oppor-
tunistic behavior by both agencies and opponents which can undermine the 
integrity of the NEPA process. When cases are litigated, for example, both 
agencies and opponents should be strictly confined to the administrative 
record.152 The onus on an agency to address a specific risk or uncertainty 
should depend to a great extent on the specificity with which the risk or 
uncertainty was raised during the administrative process.153 Where a risk or 
uncertainty was raised only generally or in passing in comments before the 
agency, agencies should be given broad leeway in choosing how much to 
address the topic; when a more specific or detailed objection is raised, the 
agencies’ burden should increase as well. In general, substantive require-
ments should be applied flexibly to reward agencies that make good-faith, 
reasonable attempts at environmental planning and to acknowledge the 
variety of legitimate approaches to addressing risks and uncertainties and 
                                                                                                                      
 150. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003). 
 151. Id. at 75,057, 75,064–65; see generally Oren A. Amram, When Worlds Collide: Transfer 
Pricing Tax Strategies and the Securities Laws, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 324, 344–45 (2008) 
(discussing the SEC guidance); William O. Fisher, Where Were the Counselors? Reflections on 
Advice Not Given and the Role of Attorneys in the Accounting Crisis, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 99 
n.170 (2004) (discussing the SEC guidance). 
 152. Although a guiding principle of judicial review under the APA is that the court’s 
review should be limited to the administrative record developed before the agency, see Camp 
v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), a surprising number of cases allow extra-record affidavits 
and testimony in NEPA cases, without explaining why the evidence could not have been 
produced before the agency, see, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 
177, 201 (4th Cir. 2009) (allowing consideration of expert witness testimony on the grounds 
that “a NEPA suit is inherently a challenge to the adequacy of the administrative record”); 
Colo. Wild v. Vilsack, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1239–42 (D. Colo. 2010) (holding that a “NEPA 
exception” exists to the general prohibition against supplementing the administrative record 
with additional testimony not presented to the agency). 
 153. Cf. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
Forest Service need not “affirmatively present every uncertainty in its EIS,” but rather 
“must acknowledge and respond to comments by outside parties that raise significant scien-
tific uncertainties and reasonably support that such uncertainties exist”). 
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the numerous judgments that are required for NEPA analyses. Agencies 
should not, however, be allowed to avoid meaningful engagement with the 
risks and uncertainties that underlie their analyses by burying discussions 
of significant risks and uncertainties deep in their NEPA documents. 
Despite the superficial allure of an apparently bright-line rule like a 
worst-case analysis requirement, the functional approach outlined here 
offers important advantages. A context-sensitive standard reflects the  
complex mix of factors that determine whether a risk or uncertainty is 
significant enough to warrant discussion and consideration in a NEPA 
document. Variability in the types of risks and uncertainties, data availabil-
ity, resource and time constraints, and the ways in which risks and 
uncertainties can be relevant to agencies’ decisions also require flexibility in 
requirements for how risks and uncertainties should be discussed. 
There are, of course, downsides to flexibility, which should not be  
dismissed lightly. Flexibility and context sensitivity can resemble ad hoc 
decision making, which has its disadvantages. Ad hoc standards can impair 
transparency and exacerbate biases.154 They also can allow inconsistency 
and, potentially, analytical laziness.155 The legal unpredictability that results 
from flexible standards also makes it difficult to plan, increases the likeli-
hood of costly and time-consuming litigation, and invites courts to inject 
policy preferences into their decisions. But this is only in comparison to a 
bright-line rule that actually creates clarity. A rule that only looks clear and 
only appears to create bright-line distinctions, but loses its clarity when 
implemented, is even more pernicious than ad hoc decision making because 
it obscures rather than highlights the judgments the agency must make. 
The result will either be unfettered agency discretion or courts applying 
idiosyncratic review criteria. Moreover, context-sensitive standards do not 
necessarily devolve to ad hocery if they maintain analytical focus. A func-
tional approach does not give agencies unfettered discretion in how they 
address risks and uncertainties, but rather evaluates agencies’ approaches in 
terms of how well they effectuate NEPA’s goals. So long as agencies and 
courts stay focused on that pragmatic inquiry, they will avoid the pitfalls of 
flexible standards. 
The debate over how NEPA should address risks and uncertainties is 
occurring within the context of a broader ongoing evaluation of NEPA’s 
successes and shortcomings.156 Some of the proposals that have been 
                                                                                                                      
 154. See Owen, supra note 105, at 313–26. 
 155. Cf. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its 
Workers’ Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 63-64 (2009) (noting that 
flexibility in legal rules can lead to inconsistent results); Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1179 (2011) (noting that the flexibility afforded by plea bargaining in 
criminal cases can lead to inconsistent results). 
 156. See supra Part I. 
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forwarded for reforming NEPA generally could improve how agencies 
address environmental risks and uncertainties. Brad Karkkainen, for exam-
ple, has argued persuasively that NEPA should shift away from ex ante 
prediction toward more monitoring and adaptive management to mitigate 
adverse impacts as they arise.157 His approach, if adopted, could reduce the 
eventuation of environmental risks, both by providing information feedback 
that improves ex ante predictions regarding environmental risks and by 
emphasizing post-decision actions that can mitigate risks more effectively 
as more information becomes available over time.158 But even promising 
proposals for general NEPA reform such as Karkkainen’s cannot solve or 
avoid the conundrums that plague planning for environmental risks and 
uncertainties. Environmental planning necessarily requires ex ante predic-
tions based on information that will always be imperfect and incomplete.159 
Any benefits that general NEPA reforms can provide in this area will be on 
the margin, which is not to say that they will not be important or signifi-
cantly beneficial. It is to say, however, that regardless of what happens with 
NEPA overall, there is and will be a strong need for an approach for deal-
ing with the specific problem of risks and uncertainties. 
Adopting a functional approach to risks and uncertainties under NEPA 
would not require amending NEPA, its implementing regulations, or any 
fundamental principles that have arisen in NEPA cases. In that sense, 
adopting a functional approach would refine rather than rewrite existing 
NEPA law. This creates a relatively easy opportunity for CEQ, the institu-
tion charged with coordinating NEPA implementation across all federal 
agencies, to promote adoption of a functional approach to risks and uncer-
tainties. In recent years, CEQ has issued several new guidance documents 
for the purpose of promoting effective NEPA implementation.160 Courts 
                                                                                                                      
 157. Karkkainen, supra note 24; see also Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving 
Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 941–48 
(2003) (arguing in favor of more post-decision monitoring under NEPA). 
 158. See Karkkainen, supra note 24, at 907–08. 
 159. Other proposed changes to NEPA law are not aimed specifically at environmental 
risks and uncertainties and therefore would have even less effect on planning for environ-
mental risks. See, e.g., Bear, supra note 157, at 949–54 (urging clarification of the extent of 
NEPA’s extraterritorial application). To the extent they improve the effectiveness of NEPA 
generally, they may improve planning for environmental risks. However, some proposed 
changes may complicate the task of planning for environmental risks, even if they improve 
NEPA’s effectiveness overall. See, e.g., id. at 954–57 (proposing that NEPA documents 
should include more analysis of social impacts); James L. Connaughton, Modernizing the 
National Environmental Policy Act: Back to the Future, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (2003) 
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note 11, at 307–11, 312 (calling for agencies to expand their NEPA analyses by including 
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 160. See, e.g., Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality, to 
Heads of Fed. Dep’ts and Agencies regarding Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring 
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have relied on this guidance in interpreting NEPA’s mandates.161 CEQ 
could improve the effectiveness of NEPA analyses across the federal  
government and exert a positive influence on the development of NEPA 
law in the courts by issuing a new guidance document that advises federal 
agencies to adopt a functional approach to risks and uncertainties in their 
NEPA documents. The result could be NEPA documents that, without 
increasing the burdens on federal agencies, usefully address risks and uncer-
tainties in a way that advances NEPA’s goal of environmentally informed 
decision making across the federal government. 
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Categorical Exclusions Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Nov. 23, 2010); 
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